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The gender gap in pay in company boards
Marı´a Consuelo Pucheta-Martı´nez*,y and Inmaculada Bel-Oms**
The aim of this study is to analyze whether a gender wage gap exists in the boards of
directors (BD) of companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange from 2004 to 2011.
5 Wehypothesize that the percentage of female directors on a BD, the presence of female
directors on the Nomination and Compensation Committee, the presence of well-
qualified independent women directors on BD, the sector, and the geographical
region, have an effect on the gender wage gap. The results show that the percentage
of female directors on a BD and the geographical region have no effect on the gender
10 wage gap. On the other hand, the finding reports that women’s presence on the
Nomination and Compensation Committee increases the gender gap in pay, and it is
reducedwhen there are independent female directorswhohave gained adegree on the
BD, and when the company operates in the finance and real estate services sector. In
addition, the results also demonstrate that the seniority of the female directors de-
15 creases the gender gap in pay, while there is a rise when the companies are bigger and
the size of the BD and the return on assets increase. These conclusions should encour-
age regulatory bodies to adopt forceful rules to mitigate the gender gap in pay.
JEL classification: M12, M0.
1. Introduction
20 Men’s compensation has remained higher than women’s for decades, resulting in a
gender salary gap in which female pay has consistently been lower than that of their
male counterparts. Gosling and Lemieux (2001) observed the ongoing existence of
this gender pay gap in the labor markets of the most advanced industrialized coun-
tries. Meanwhile, Chu Ng (2004) and Cho (2007) showed that Chinese and Korean
25 women also earned less than men. Jolliffe (2002) obtained similar results for
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Bulgaria. Chevalier (2007) found that women in the United Kingdom earned 20%
less than men, despite the country’s long-standing anti-discrimination policies.
Kulich et al. (2011) also examined the gender pay gap in senior posts at UK firms,
finding that the salaries earned by male executives were higher than those of women
5at the same level of financial performance.
Previous studies focusing on analyzing gender gap in pay (Blau and Kahn, 1992;
Kunze, 2005; Miyoshi, 2008; Vitaliano, 2009) show that it is caused by occupational
segregation (Bayard et al., 1999; Palacio and Simo´n, 2006; De la Rica, 2007) and
other factors that can be explained by human capital theory (Garcı´a et al., 2001;
10Amarante and Espino, 2002; Rubery et al., 2005; Varela et al., 2010).
In this light, there is a clear need for further research into the factors underlying the
gender gap in pay, an issue that has aroused considerable interest both in Spain
(Herna´ndez, 1995; Palacio and Simo´n, 2002; Simo´n, 2009) and internationally (Wood
et al., 1993; Miyoshi, 2008; Papapetrou, 2008; Olsen et al., 2009; Vitaliano, 2009).
15The aim of this study is to analyze whether there are differences in the pay earned
by male and female directors serving on the boards of firms listed on the Madrid
Stock Exchange, in the period 2004–2011, and if so, to examine the explanatory
factors behind the gender gap in pay.
This study is particularly relevant in the Spanish context, as most analyses of the
20gender gap in pay refer to the English-speaking nations, or to Eastern European and
some Asian countries. The contribution made by this study lies in its analysis of the
gender gap in pay among the directors of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange,
as most existing studies (Simo´n, 2006; De la Rica, 2007; Del Rio et al, 2011) use data
from the European Structure of Earnings Survey and as most of the previous empirical
25literature on the gender wage gap is based on the labor market in general, but very little
empirical evidence for the groups of boards of directors (BD) in listed private com-
panies exists. The results reported are therefore particularly important, as they confirm
that there is a gender gap in pay at the top of the corporate hierarchy in Spain, due
basically to the presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee.
30The structure of this article is as follows. This introduction is followed by a
description of the institutional background in Spain. The third section describes
the theoretical background and previous literature. The fourth section develops
the hypotheses predicted. The fifth section describes the methodology and sample
used in the study, and the sixth section shows the results obtained. In the seventh and
35final section, we discuss our conclusions and explain the limitations inherent in this
study, at the same time pointing to possible future lines of research.
2. Institutional background
In Spain, between the 1970s and the 1990s many changes in legislation governing the
treatment of men and women were introduced. There has been a general belief that
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one of the fundamental characteristics of the Spanish labor market was, and maybe
is, the persistent and strong wage discrimination due to gender for similar jobs: men
are clearly paid more than women. The equality principle was highlighted in Article
14 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, which clearly prohibited discrimination on
5 grounds of gender. The Workers’ Statute Act of 1980 (amended several times since
then) established in Article 28 a wage equality for work of equal value. Moreover, the
third Plan for Equal Opportunities for Men and Women (1997–2000) recognized the
persistence of unjustifiable wage inequalities for women already working. To palliate
this unequal situation, a number of actions were taken under the Plan to provide
10 women with real access to employment with full social and economic rights by
encouraging structural changes and transformations that favored this purpose. In
total and to date, there are four Plans for Equal Opportunities, the Activity Plans for
Employment (with a special emphasis on gender equality) of 1998, and the EU
Strategy Plan for Gender Equality of June 7, 2000. The Act 3/2007 of 22 March,
15 “The Equality Law,” for effective equality between women and men (LOIMH), im-
plemented in 2007, in Article 5 also highlights that wage equality has to prevail
between men and women. This regulation has had a positive impact mainly on
discrimination in the public sector where today, one can hardly find a pay gap
anymore in Spain (Ullibarri, 2003; Ala´ez et al., 2011).
20 Academic research into the pay earned by company directors in Spain was no easy
task until only a few years ago, because the majority of listed firms did not publish
information about board compensation. However, the Spanish Listed Companies
Transparency Act (Law 26/2003), enacted in 2003 with the full backing of the
National Securities Market Commission (CNMV), made it mandatory for listed
25 firms to disclose details of directors’ pay in their Annual Reports. As a consequence,
data on the pay earned by Spanish directors have become available since this legis-
lation entered the statute book. In 2011, the Sustainable Economy Act 2/2011 was
passed to strengthen the application of EU Directive CRD3 for the financial sector
and provide similar regulations for all listed companies. Under part of the Act, listed
30 companies have to submit director and senior executive remuneration policy to a
non-binding vote at the general meeting of shareholders.
The Spanish Corporate Governance System has been subject to significant reforms
since the first publication in 1998 of what is known as the Olivencia Report, whose
recommendations focused on the performance of firms and the publication of public
35 information. It was followed in 2002 by the Law on Measures to Reform the
Financial System (LMRFS), and in 2003 by the Law on Transparency of Listed
Firms (LTLF). In 2003, the Aldama Report was also published and replaced the
Olivencia Report and finally, in 2006 the Unified Code of Corporate Governance
(CUBG) report or Conthe Code, was published, which unifies the Olivencia and
40 Aldama Codes. The purpose of the CUBG (2006) was to improve business manage-
ment and return transparency to the Spanish system.
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In this context, it is noteworthy that the continuous political and socioeconomic
changes in Spain in recent years have increased gender diversity in BD. This raise was
enhanced by the publication of the Conthe Code (CUBG, 2006), whose recommen-
dations are intended to support female presence in decision-making bodies and
5eliminate possible discrimination. According to Gonza´le´z Mene´ndez and Martı´nez
Gonza´lez (2012), after this recommendation and the debate of the Draft Equality
Law, most of the improvements in women’s representation on boards occurred
between 2005 and 2006. In addition, Act 3/2007 of 22 March, “The Equality Law,”
in Article 75 frames the regulation of the appointment of women and men in BDs in
10an equitable form for a period of 8 years since the law came into force. Spanish law
followed the pattern of Norway, the first country in the world to establish a gender
quota of 40% in boards, and this law also forced companies to reach a gender quota
of 40% by 2015. De Anca (2008) argues that this percentage is not a high target, given
the high level of rotation among board members in Spanish listing firms. However,
15the progress made is still too slow to meet the government’s 2015 target, and for this
reason, Gonza´lez-Mene´ndez and Martı´nez-Gonza´lez (2012) recommend that stron-
ger government sanctions, combined with more effective equality plans within com-
panies, are required for the quota to be met.
In this sense, Gonza´lez-Mene´ndez and Martı´nez-Gonza´lez (2012) analyzed the
20Spanish Labour Force Survey and reported that the presence of women directors
on the listed firms’ corporate boards rose from 5.6% in 2002 to 10.40% in 2010. In
the same vein, De Anca (2008) examined 127 listed companies in 2006, including the
Ibex 35 firms, and documented that only 5.1% of the members of the Ibex 35 BDs
were women directors, while the non-Ibex 35 companies had 6.7% women in BDs.
25The United Nations Report (2010) documented that the proportion of women
increased from 6% in 2007 to only 10% on Spanish boards in 2009.
3. Theoretical background and previous literature
The salary structure of developed countries shows a gap in pay as a consequence of a
higher influence in supply and the demand. For decades, the remunerations received
30by males have been, and are, greater than those of females, giving rise to a gender gap
in pay. De Pablos (2001) documented that the salary received by women was smaller
than men’s and in 40% of the cases, the women’s compensation was below the
minimum salary. Amarante and Espino (2001, 2002) observed that the Uruguayan
job market exhibited an important gender gap in pay. The two most relevant eco-
35nomic approaches that explain male–female wage differences in the companies are
the human capital theory (Terjesen et al., 2009) and occupational segregation.
In this sense, previous studies that have analyzed gender gap in pay in developed
countries (Blau and Kahn, 1992) have reported that most of the gender gap in pay is
explained by human capital theory (Garcı´a et al., 2001; Amarante and Espino, 2002;
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Varela et al., 2010) and occupational segregation theory (Bayard et al., 1999; Palacio
and Simo´n, 2006; De la Rica, 2007).
Human capital theory posits that individuals invest in themselves, building up
their own stock of knowledge, experience, and skills over the years (Becker, 1964).
5 Human capital can be acquired either by years of educational attainment, or in the
labor market, measured in terms of years of experience or seniority in a given job.
For this reason, individuals can increase their productivity by learning work skills
while they are on the job. However, women tend to invest less in human capital than
men, mainly because they take on a greater share of domestic responsibilities and are
10 less committed to their careers (Wood et al., 1993; Lips, 2003). Burke (2000) argues
that board selectors held the assumption that women lack adequate human capital
for board positions. This argument is empirically supported by Westphal and Milton
(2000) and Singh et al. (2008), who reported that women directors are less likely to
have top manager or focal director experience than men directors. In the same vein,
15 Catalyst (1993) showed that CEOs were reluctant to appoint women as directors of
BDs because they believe that females are unqualified. Carli (1990) and Heilman and
Haynes (2005) documented that in a male-dominated context, female with work
experience can neutralize negative opinions about women’s performance, but they
are presumed to be less competent than men. Thus, women begin their careers with
20 less human capital than men and reap less compensation than men (Tharenou et al.,
1994).
Hillman et al. (2002) showed that groups such as women can compensate for the
effects of discrimination and subjective bias in selection procedures if they gain
postgraduate qualifications. However, Herna´ndez (1995) demonstrated that graduate
25 men earned much more than women with the same university training. Similar
evidence was reported by Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004). Garcı´a et al. (2001)
showed that the gender gap in pay in Spain is higher for more trained women.
Palacio and Simo´n (2002) and Ullibarri (2003) provide similar evidence.
According to CES (Consejo Econo´mico and Social, 2011), the gender gap in pay
30 was exhibited at all training levels and it was greater when women were more trained.
Contrary to this evidence, Gardı´n and Del Rı´o (2009), Gonzalo and Pons (2001), and
Ullibarri (2003) reported that between graduate men and women, there was not a
gender gap in pay, but it was exhibited among women with elementary education.
Singh et al. (2008) showed that women had minor board experience but not less
35 business experience than men. Studies such as De la Rica and Ugidos (1995) and
Herna´ndez (1995) demonstrated that women obtained a higher salary as they gained
more experience in the company, and therefore, the gender gap in pay was reduced.
In addition, Herna´ndez (1995) demonstrated that when a woman’s work contract
lasted at least 2 years, their salary was increased, while that of men did not. Ala´ez and
40 Ullibarri (1999) analyzed whether all Spanish regions exhibited a gender gap in pay
and reported that women’s experience was less than men’s experience in all regions.
Moreover, the authors demonstrated that the difference in experience between males
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and females was caused because women retired from active working life in order to
take care of their children, which is one of the most important factors explaining the
gender gap in pay. Simo´n et al. (2005) documented that the average salary earned by
women was similar to men’s salary when both had less experience in their jobs.
5According to Ortega (2007), experience was a key factor in establishing the pay of
males and females.
Regarding women’s seniority, it is expected that as women have more seniority,
the gender gap exhibited in pay is smaller. The reason for the low seniority of women
is the tardy incorporation of women into the labor market and their commitment to
10family life. In this sense, De la Rica and Ugidos (1995) showed that men with more
seniority earned much more than women. The authors also reported that when
women had the same education and seniority as men, the reduction of the gender
gap in pay is 50%. According to CES (2011), the gender gap in pay between males
and females was higher as the seniority between them increased.
15The occupational segregation approach excludes women from certain kinds of
work, so that they tend to be concentrated in low-paid occupations (Dolado et al.,
2004; Leaker, 2008; Olsen et al., 2009). Segregation can arise as the result of employer
discrimination in hiring and promotion, or from human capital differences in edu-
cation levels. In addition, occupational segregation can be divided between horizon-
20tal and vertical: the first analyses how men and women are distributed according to
their occupation, and the second examines the distribution of male and female ac-
cording to the hierarchical level within the organisation. The existence of a gender
gap in pay in some occupations may be due to women being discouraged from
entering high-wage occupations by discriminatory barriers. Jurajda (2003) demon-
25strated that the segregation of women in low-paying occupations was one third of the
total wage gap. Simo´n (2006) reported that occupational segregation was a key factor
in the gender gap in pay.
Authors such as Groshen (1991), Johnson and Solon (1986), and MacPherson and
Hirsch (1995), among others, documented that men had higher wages than women,
30as women were employed in jobs where average remuneration was lower. Palacio and
Simo´n (2002) concluded that the gender gap in pay in most of the cases is due to the
way men and women are distributed within the labor market, as women are con-
centrated in jobs with low salaries. In the same vein, previous studies (Bayard et al.,
1999; De la Rica, 2003) showed that women earned less than men because females
35were concentrated in low-paid occupations. Bell (2005) demonstrated that executive
women with the same education and occupation earned less than executive men.
Simo´n et al. (2005) concluded that the segregation of women increased in low-paid
occupations and in those jobs where there were a high number of women. Ortega
(2007) reported that the higher the occupational segregation, the higher the gender
40gap in pay. Thus, in those jobs with a high concentration of men, the gender gap in
pay exhibited will be higher. Ala´ez and Ullibarri (1999) showed that women earned
19% less than men when both occupied the same job and had the same education.
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Bell (2005), Bird et al. (2007), and Castan˜o et al. (2008) demonstrated that of men
and women directors, females earned less than males. Tenjo et al. (2005) analyzed the
gender gap in pay in six Latin American countries and reported that the gender gap
in pay per hour was reduced in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and
5 Uruguay, but in Costa Rica it considerably increased. In addition, they demonstrated
that in Argentina, Colombia, and Honduras, the average wage per hour of women
was higher than of men, except for housekeepers. Palacio and Simo´n (2006) showed
that in the period 1995–2002, men earned higher salaries than women in the same
hierarchical level and occupation, while Bird et al. (2007) documented that female
10 accountants earned $24 per hour less than male accountants. In the same sense,
Castan˜o et al. (2008) revealed that executive women received 42% less of the wage
than men. Porto et al. (2010) demonstrated that women directors earned 16.5% less
than male directors, and the gender gap in pay was lower when the hierarchical level
was lower.
15
4. Hypotheses development
4.1 Board membership: percentage of female directors on the board and
presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee
Although women were scarcely represented on company boards until comparatively
recently, their numbers have risen over the last decade or so, as they have become
20 progressively better qualified. Mateos et al. (2007) found that only 6.61% of directors
in the 1085 largest Spanish firms were women. Meanwhile, statistics published by the
Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE, 2012) show that women made up 10.3%
of directors in IBEX 35 companies, which is still low but nonetheless a considerable
improvement—in 2005 less than 2% were women.
25 The percentage of female directors on BD may be an important factor for the
supervision and control of the board’s activities (Adams and Ferreira, 2009;
Schwartz-Ziv, 2011). In this sense, research has found that women on boards have
an important influence on firm performance (Adler, 2001; Adam and Ferreira, 2003;
Carter et al., 2003; Catalyst, 2004; Farrel and Hersh, 2005; Krishnan and Park, 2005;
30 Shrader et al., 2007; Campbell and Mı´nguez, 2008), financial reporting quality or
fostering good corporate practice (Rogelberg and Rumery, 1996; Burgess and
Tharenou, 2002), and dividend policy (Van Pelt, 2013; Wellalage et al., 2012),
among others. Given the importance of women on boards in allocating capital to
corporations, as well as their role in firm governance, an understanding of how their
35 presence in boards affects the gender pay gap is undoubtedly needed.
Most studies that focus on wage disparity between male and female report that men
earn significantly more than women, although some researchers argue that men and
women receive similar compensation at management levels (Bowlin and Renne, 2008).
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Blau and Khan (2001) demonstrated that the implementation of a gender quota in BDs
could develop egalitarian wage structures, and reduce the gender gap in pay. Bilimoria
(2006) found a positive association between female corporate board members and
women among the top corporate earners, exhibiting a smaller gender gap in pay.
5Terjesen and Singh (2008) show that boards with a higher representation of women
are more likely to have women in senior management and smaller gender pay gaps.
Smith et al. (2011) revealed that for the small and select group of CEOs the gender
compensation gap decreased slightly. Jacobs (1992) demonstrated a narrowing of the
gender pay gap among directors that is correlated with a substantial rise in the number
10of female directors. In the same vein, Cohen and Huffman (2007) demonstrated that as
the representation of female directors increased, the gender wage gap narrowed.
According to Jordan et al. (2007), for women who have reached a seat on the
board, no gender pay gap exists, as females are paid virtually the same as their male
counterparts.
15Fondas and Sassalos (2000) indicated that women tend to have higher expectations
regarding their responsibilities as directors, which may induce them to expend more
effort on their tasks. Similarly, Huse and Solberg (2006) showed that women on
corporate boards are better prepared for board meetings than men; thus, female rep-
resentation may improve board behavior and effectiveness. According to Ittonen et al.
20(2010), gender diversity may improve the efficiency of corporate boards simply be-
cause female directors, in general, are presumably highly competent and hardworking.
In this sense, Ye et al. (2010) provide evidence that companies with a higher propor-
tion of women directors perform better than those without gender diversity, and
Nielsen and Huse (2010) illustrated that women’s presence on a BD reduces conflicts
25between the members of the board, thus promoting best practices in the company.
Thus, we presume that female directors may improve the monitoring activities of the
BD and as a result, it is more likely that they can narrow the gender gap in pay.
Hence, based on the arguments and evidence presented above, we hypothesize that
a higher percentage of women directors on boards will decrease the gender wage gap:
30Hypothesis 1: Firms with a greater percentage of female directors on their boards will
be more likely to have a smaller gender pay gap among directors of the Board
On the other hand, the pay of directors on the board can be a bone of contention
between managers and shareholders. The Spanish Unified Code of Good Governance
(CUBG, 2006) recommended the inclusion of women on a board and its committees,
35assigning responsibility for selection processes to the Nomination Committee, which
should seek to recruit candidates with the required professional profile while avoid-
ing gender discrimination at all times. Meanwhile, responsibility for proposing
directors’ and executives’ pay lies with the Compensation Committee.
According to Klein (2003), Compensation Committees should not confine them-
40selves to moderating directors’ pay, but should also take responsibility for the design
of remuneration structures capable of incentivizing behavior in line with
8 of 44 M. C. Pucheta-Martı´nez and I. Bel-Oms
shareholders’ interests and rewarding enhanced business performance. Conyon
(1997), Klein (1998), Kose and Lemma (1998) and Among others, Arrondo et al.
(2008) found that the presence of a Nomination and Compensation Committee did
in fact rein in directors’ pay. Shin (2012) shows that the gender gap in executive pay
5 is smaller when a greater percentage of women sit on the Compensation Committee
of the board, which is the group responsible for setting executive compensation.
As shown above, the previous evidence about the relationship between the pres-
ence of women directors on the Compensation Committee and the gender wage gap
is scarce. However, we predict that the presence of women on the Nomination and
10 Compensation Committee will increase the gender pay gap among board members
for two reasons. The first reason is because women are less likely to sit on
Compensation Committees than men (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), and this means
that women directors have less involvement in setting boards members pay and not
as much influence over the design of board director’s compensation as their male
15 counterparts, and consequently, they cannot put pressure on their male counterparts
in order to get equal salaries for all board members. Secondly, according to Kulich
et al. (2011), members of the Compensation Committee, mainly men, may feel the
need to offer male directors higher compensation compared with that offered to
female directors, in order to attract and retain male directors on the board, as male
20 directors on Compensation Committees perceive female leaders to be less instru-
mental in achieving particular corporate outcomes.
In light of the above, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with the presence of women on the Nomination and
Compensation Committee will be more likely to have a greater gender pay gap
25 among directors of the Board
4.2 Educational level of female independent directors
As women have joined the labor market in increasing numbers in recent decades, they
have become progressively better qualified, allowing them to rise above their historical
situation, which confined them largely to basic education and domestic concerns.
30 Education, a human capital variable that is positively related to the ability of the
manager, has a clear effect on pay (Coelho et al., 2010). Education can potentially
increase earning power, and women are specifically encouraged to use education where
possible to increase their earning potential (Lips, 2008). If educational qualifications
are important determinants of performance in a company, and if females have higher
35 levels of qualifications (Blau and Kahn, 2007), then women will earn higher wages
(Arulampalam et al., 2007). As a consequence, the gender wage gap can be reduced.
In this sense, Mukhopadhayay (2001) observed that rising female education in
Singapore caused a reduction in the gender pay gap. Similarly, the education received
by Canadian women in the period 1986–1991 was the determining factor in narrowing
40 the gap between male and female compensation (Christie and Shannon, 2001).
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Ullibarri (2003) Gonzalo and Pons (2001) and Gardı´n and Del Rı´o (2009) reported
that between graduate men and women, there was no gender gap in pay, but it was
seen for women with elementary education. Ala´ez and Ullibarri (1999) analyzed the
gender gap in pay in the different regions of Spain, finding the largest gender pay gaps
5were in those regions where both men and women were least educated and the edu-
cation of women was similar to that of men (Murcia and Castile-La Mancha). Along
the same lines, the Spanish Economic and Social Council (CES, 2011), Del Rı´o et al.
(2011), and Simo´n et al. (2008), among others, found that the gender-based salary gap
narrows with the level of education. Coelho et al. (2010) also reported that the gender
10wage gap is narrower when women have more advanced degrees. Similar evidence was
reported by other authors (Blau and Kahn, 2007; Chevalier, 2007; Izquierdo and
Lacuesta, 2007), who showed that improvements in the level of women’s qualifications
explain a substantial portion of the narrowing of the gender pay gap.
Contrary to this evidence, Garcı´a et al. (2001), Palacio and Simo´n (2002), Jurajda
15(2003), Mirta (2003), De la Rica et al. (2005), Simo´n et al. (2005), Plantenga and
Remedy (2006), Bo¨heim et al. (2007) and Ortega (2007) reported that the gender pay
gap is greater among better qualified workers, while Simo´n (2006) found that the gap
in pay between the best educated male and female workers was greater in Spain than
in any other European country, except Ireland, although the gap was smaller among
20less well-qualified workers. Palacio and Simo´n (2002) and Cho (2007) reported that
male–female pay inequality was greater in both Spain and Korea not only when the
women concerned lacked educational qualifications, but also among female gradu-
ates. Herna´ndez (1995), Lauer (2000) and De la Rica (2007) showed that men earned
higher pay than women even when they were educated to the same level.
25Our aim was to investigate the qualifications of all women holding board level
office in listed Spanish firms. However, published Corporate Governance reports
only include information on the qualifications of independent directors, and we
shall therefore confine ourselves to examining the qualifications of these women.
Human capital theory argues that one of the explanations for the gender wage gap is
30the difference in human capital among individuals, such as education (Lazear and
Rosen, 1990; Crossley et al., 1994; Mincer and Polachek, 1994). Tharenou et al.
(1994) argue that females, compared with males, have traditionally made fewer in-
vestments in education and work experience and this is reflected in lower pay and
promotion. Thus, based on this argument and previous evidence, we posit that the
35presence of qualified women directors on the BD will diminish the gender gap in pay,
as qualified female directors may receive top salaries and positions as often as their
male counterparts. Consequently, well-qualified female independent directors will
help narrow the gender pay gap. Hence, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a presence of well-qualified female independent directors
40on boards will be more likely to have a smaller gender pay gap among directors of the
Board
10 of 44 M. C. Pucheta-Martı´nez and I. Bel-Oms
4.3 Firm sector
The sector in which a firm operates is an important factor, as the businesses in which
they engage may influence gender gap in pay (Jurajda and Harmgart, 2007). Kulich
et al. (2011) examined UK listed firms from 1998 to 2004 and demonstrated that
5 there was a significant gender pay gap in executive positions when controlling for
industry. Skalpe (2007) analyzed 1.866 private firms from the tourism and manu-
facturing industries from 1999 to 2001 and showed that female CEOs were wage-
discriminated in both sectors. Nonetheless, the gender gap in pay was greater in
tourism companies because the female CEOs in this industry were employed in
10 smaller firms than is the case in manufacturing. Bertrand and Hallock (2001) also
found a considerable gender wage gap in top management, and most of the gender
pay differential was explained by industry or occupational levels, among other
reasons. Meanwhile, Renner et al. (2002) demonstrated that variations in annual
compensation between female and male executive directors can be explained by
15 the industrial sector.
Contrary to this evidence, Vieito and Khan (2012) reported that there was no
gender wage gap between male and female executive directors of BD of technology
firms. Similar evidence was reported by Smith et al. (2011) and Holst and Busch
(2009), who after controlling for industry and other characteristics, showed that a
20 gender wage gap among directors did not exist.
The existing evidence is not conclusive and therefore, it is not evident how the
sector in which the company operates can explain the gender gap in pay that may
exist between male and female directors of the BD. Consequently, we propose the
following hypothesis:
25 Hypothesis 4: The sector in which the company operates can increase or narrow the
gender wage gap among directors of the Board
4.4 Geographical region
The compensation of male and female board members may vary depending on the
geographical region of the company (Lago, 2002), mainly due to differences in the
30 cost of living and non-monetary conditions of employment. Towns and cities are
often more expensive than rural areas (Skalpe, 2007). Gomez-Mejia et al. (1987)
proposed that geographical location might affect the executives’ compensation level.
In this vein, Holst (2006) examined 80,000 German firms and demonstrated that
women and men directors on the board both earned significantly less in East
35 Germany (former GDR) than in West Germany, but the regional difference was
larger for men. This result suggests that firm location influences the gender wage
gap. In contrast with this finding, Skalpe (2007) examined Norwegian tourism and
manufacturing companies and showed that the urban location of the company did
not appear to influence the gender wage gap among executive directors.
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Ala´ez and Ullibarri (1999) examined male–female compensation discrimination
in the Spanish regions, finding the widest gender pay gaps in Catalonia and Murcia
and the smallest in the Balearic Islands and La Rioja. Meanwhile, Palacio and Simo´n
(2002) found a significant gender pay gap in large firms located in Catalonia and
5Madrid. Finally, the report of the Spanish National Statistics Institute entitled INE:
Women and Men of Spain (2012) lists the Autonomous Communities with the
smallest gender pay gaps as the Canary Islands (13.6%), Extremadura (15.8%), the
Balearic Islands (20.2%), and Castile-La Mancha (21.9%). The gap was widest in
Asturias (29.8%) and Aragon (31.1%).
10Internationally, Chu Ng (2004) studied data obtained from the Chinese Office of
Statistics for the period 1988–1992, arguing that the gender pay gap was widest in
western China, away from the coast, where economic progress has been slower. In
contrast, they showed that rapid growth along China’s eastern seaboard and in the
center of the country reduced the pay gap. Leaker (2008) reported that women’s
15compensation was lower throughout the United Kingdom, and that the gender pay
gap was widest in the South-West and South-East of the country.
Like the firm sector variable, it is not easy to predict a priori whether a firm’s
geographical region will increase or decrease male–female compensation differences
between directors, because the gender pay gap depends on the specific location of
20each firm, as the existing literature shows. In this light, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The geographical region in which the company is situated can increase
or narrow the gender wage gap among directors of the Board
5. Methodology and sample
255.1 Methodology
We shall use the following model to empirically test the hypotheses proposed above:
REMUit¼ 0þ 1PERCWBDitþ 2 PWNCCitþ 3ELIWBD (1)itþ 4ELIWBD
(2)itþ5 FSEC (1) itþ 6 FSEC (2) itþ 7 FSEC (3) itþ8 FSEC (4) itþ9 FSEC
(5) it þ10 GREG (1)itþ 11 GREG (2)itþ 12 GREG (3)itþ13 GREG (4)itþ14
30GREG (5)itþ 15 SEN(1) itþ 16 SEN(2)itþ17 SEN(3) itþ 18 FIRMSIZEitþ19
PRODitþ 20 ROAitþ 21 BDSIZEitþ
P
j j FIRMjþit
Where the dependent variable, REMUit, is calculated as the logarithm of the
difference between the compensation of male and female directors in firms listed
on the Madrid Stock Exchange.1 The calculation of this variable is based on annual
35rather than hourly pay, because that is how the data are presented in the Annual
1 The logarithm of the difference between mean values of male and female directors’ compensation
of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange has been also used as a dependent variable. The mean
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Corporate Governance Reports published by the firms analyzed. The remuneration
considered comprises fixed and variable pay, as well as allowances. The variables used
in the model and the expected signs of each are shown in Table 1.
5.2 Independent and control variables
5 5.2.1 Independent variables
Percentage of female directors on the board
This variable is denoted by “PERCWBD” and it is calculated as the ratio between the
total number of female directors on the board and the total number of directors on
the board. It is expected to be negative, as we predict that the gender pay gap between
10 directors will narrow given an increase in the percentage of female board members.
Presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee
Female membership of the Nomination and Compensation Committee is approxi-
mated by the variable “PWNCC,” defined as a dummy variable which takes a value of
1 if the members of the committee include any women and 0, otherwise. This vari-
15 able is expected to be positive, as we predict that the presence of women on the
Nomination and Compensation Committee will increase the gender pay gap between
directors.
Educational level of female independent directors in the Board of Directors
“ELIWBD” represents the educational level of female independent directors on the
20 board. As explained above, we have only considered the qualifications of female
independent directors because this is the only data regarding the education of
board members contained in Corporate Governance Reports. “ELIWBD” is calcu-
lated as a categorical variable, and we have therefore created C-1 dichotomous vari-
ables. Having created the dichotomous variables, the next step is to establish the
25 reference category we wish to compare with the other categories. We have classified
educational level as follows: ELIWBD (0)¼ no details of female independent director
qualifications in the Corporate Governance Report; ELIWBD (1)¼BA/BSc. degree;
and ELIWBD (2)¼ Phd. The reference category is ELIWBD (0). The variable is
expected to be negative, as the gender pay gap between directors will be narrower,
30 the better qualified the female independents serving on a firm’s board.
Firm Sector
The business sector variable was defined on the basis of the Madrid Stock Exchange
classification: FSEC (1)¼Oil and energy; FSEC (2)¼Commodities, industry, and
construction; FSEC (3)¼Consumer goods; FSEC (4)¼Consumer services; FSEC
value of compensation is calculated as the ratio between the total remuneration of the director
and the total number of directors of the BD. The results, not provided, are unaffected.
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Table 1 Independent and control variables
Variable Label Measurement Expected
sign
Independent variables
Percentage of women in
the board of directors
PERCWBD Total number of women on the board of
directors/total number of members on the
board of directors

Presence of women on the
Nomination and
Compensation Committee
PWNCC Dummy Value (1¼Presence of women on the
Nomination and Compensation Committee;
0¼ Otherwise)
þ
Educational level of
independent women in
the board of directors
ELIWBD (1) Dummy Value (1¼ Independent women
graduate; 0¼Otherwise)

Educational level of
independent women in
the board of directors
ELIWBD (2) Dummy Value (1¼ Independent women PhD;
0¼Otherwise)

Firm sector FSEC (1) Dummy Value (1¼Oil and energy;
0¼Otherwise)
þ/
Firm sector FSEC (2) Dummy Value (1¼Commodities, industry
and construction; 0¼Otherwise)
þ/
Firm sector FSEC (3) Dummy Value (1¼Consumer goods;
0¼Otherwise)
þ/
Firm sector FSEC (4) Dummy Value (1¼Consumer Services;
0¼Otherwise)
þ/
Firm sector FSEC (5) Dummy Value (1¼ Finance and property ser-
vice; 0¼Otherwise)
þ/
Geographical region GREG (1) Dummy Value (1¼Northwest;
0¼Otherwise)
þ/
Geographical region GREG (2) Dummy Value (1¼Northeast; 0¼Otherwise) þ/
Geographical region GREG (3) Dummy Value (1¼Madrid; 0¼Otherwise) þ/
Geographical region GREG (4) Dummy Value (1¼Centre; 0¼Otherwise) þ/
Geographical region GREG (5) Dummy Value (1¼ East; 0¼Otherwise) þ/
Control variables
Seniority SEN (1) Dummy Value (1¼ one year of seniority;
0¼Otherwise)

Seniority SEN (2) Dummy Value (1¼ From two to four years of
seniority; 0¼Otherwise)

Seniority SEN (3) Dummy Value (1¼ From five to eight years of
seniority; 0¼Otherwise)

Company size FIRMSIZE Log of total assets (in thousands of Euros) þ
Productivity PROD Log (Turnover/ Number of employees) þ
Return on Assets ROA Ordinary result/Average of total assets þ
Size of the board BDSIZE Total number of directors on the board of
directors
þ
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(5)¼ Financial services and property (excluding banks, which do not form part of
the sample); and FSEC (6)¼Technology and telecommunications. The value of the
dummy variables is 1 if the company belongs to the sector in question and 0 other-
wise. The reference category is FSEC (6). We expect this variable to be both positive
5 and negative, as the salary gap may increase or decrease depending on the sector to
which the firm belongs. The sector classification is shown in Table 2.
Geographical region
This variable is denoted by “GREG” and is based on the Autonomous Community
(political region) in which the firm is located. Following Arrazola and Hevia (2009)
10 and Paga´n (2007), we have grouped the Autonomous Communities into seven
macro-regions: Northwest, Northeast, Madrid, Central Spain, East, South, and
Canary Islands. Although we initially intended to follow this classification, we
found that none of the firms in the sample is in fact registered in the Canary
Islands. As a result, we included the Canaries in the South, leaving only six regions.
15 The classification of the six regions is therefore as follows: GREG (1)¼Northwest;
GREG (2)¼Northeast; GREG (3)¼Madrid; GREG (4)¼Center; GREG (5)¼ East,
and GREG (6)¼ South and Canary Islands. Table 3 details the six regions and the
Autonomous Communities that form each. Like educational level and sector, region
is a categorical variable. The reference category is GREG (6). This variable is again
20 expected to be both positive and negative, as the salary gap may widen or narrow
depending on the firm’s geographical region.
5.2.2 Control variables
To test the model, we have included five control variables that could influence male–
female differences in compensation.
25 Seniority of women on the board
The first control variable considered is seniority, which is a key factor in the pro-
motion of both men and women. It is therefore to be expected that a longer period of
service in a firm will open the way to positions of responsibility and will also reduce
the gender pay gap. Ala´ez and Ullibarri (1999) claim that the gender pay gap is
30 greater in those regions where women’s job seniority is shorter than men’s.
Barceinas et al. (2000), Lauer (2000), Mirta (2003), Simo´n (2006), and Simo´n
(2009) found that women were likely to earn less than men where they had spent
less time in their jobs. Likewise, De la Rica and Ugidos (1995), Monk and Turner
(2004), Miyoshi (2008), and Olsen et al. (2009) concluded that men with longer
35 service with their firms earned higher salaries. According to CES (2011), the gender
pay gap between men and women widened considerably as their job seniority
increased.
This categorical variable is denoted by “SEN.” The classification is as follows: SEN
(0)¼No period of seniority; SEN (1)¼ 1 year of seniority; SEN (2)¼ 2–4 years of
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Table 2 Classification of the sector
SECTOR 1 Oil and Energy
1. Oil
2. Energy and gas
3. Renewable energy
SECTOR 2 Commodities, industry, and construction
1. Minerals, metals, and transportation
2. Production equipment goods
3. Construction
4. Materials of construction
5. Chemical industry
6. Engineering and others
7. Aerospatiale
SECTOR 3 Consumer goods
1. Foods and drinks
2. Textile, dress, and shoes
3. Paper and graph arts
4. Pharmaceutical products and
5. Others consumers goods
SECTOR 4 Consumer services
1. Leisure, tourism, and hotel industry
2. Retailer trade
3. Media and advertising
4. Transport and distribution
5. Motorway and car park
6. Other services
SECTOR 5 Financial and property services
1. Bank and savings bank
2. Insurance
3. Portfolio and holding
4. SICAV
5. Real estate and others
6. Investment services
SECTOR 6 Technology and telecommunications
1. Telecommunications and others
2. Electronic and software
Table 3 Classification of the regions
Label Area Region
GREG (1) NORTHWEST Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria
GREG (2) NORTHEAST Paı´s Vasco, Navarra, La Rioja y Arago´n
GREG (3) MADRID Madrid
GREG (4) CENTER Castilla y Leo´n, Castilla la Mancha, Extremadura
GREG (5) EAST Catalun˜a, Comunidad Valenciana, Baleares
GREG (6) SOUTH AND THE CANARY ISLANDS Andalucı´a, Murcia, Ceuta, Melilla y Canarias
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seniority, and SEN (3)¼ 5–8 years of seniority. These variables take a value of 1 if
female directors have the seniority indicated in the year considered and 0, otherwise.
The reference category taken to measure this categorical variable is SEN (0). We
expect this variable to be negative. Hence, the longer a female director’s seniority, the
5 greater the reduction in the gender pay gap should be because the inclusion of
experienced female directors on the board will push firms to comply more strictly
with the gender equality legislation applicable to listed companies, and to eliminate
male–female compensation differences.
Firm size
10 The size of the firm is also used as a control variable. Size is sometimes associated
with a firm’s business and financial characteristics, and it may therefore affect the
gender pay gap. In this regard, Palacio and Simo´n (2002), Mirta (2003), Monk and
Turner (2004), Paga´n (2007) and Gardı´n and del Rı´o (2009) showed that male–
female compensation differences were greater in large firms. Meanwhile, Gartner and
15 Stephan (2004) concluded from an analysis of German companies that the gender
pay gap grew wider, the larger the firm. Bell (2005) found that firm size and the
disproportionately small number of female CEOs and company chairwomen were
responsible for between 50 and 60% of the gender pay gap. Heinze and Wolf (2010)
also reported that the gender pay gap was wider in large German concerns, at the
20 same time showing that male–female compensation differences were smaller in
family firms. However, CES (2011) observed that male–female compensation differ-
ences were greater in Spanish SMEs with less than 10 employees. Similarly, Arrondo
et al. (2008), Ferna´ndez Me´ndez et al. (2011), and Pucheta and Narro (2014) showed
that a firm’s size had a positive and significant influence on directors’ pay. The
25 variable is denoted by “FIRMSIZE” and is calculated as the logarithm of the firm’s
total assets. It is expected to be positive, as the gender pay gap among directors will
be greater the larger the firm.
Employee productivity
The third control variable used to study the gender pay gap is employee productivity,
30 which is denoted by “PROD” and is measured as the logarithm of the ratio of
turnover to the firm’s total number of employees, following Mateos et al. (2007).
The flexibility and effectiveness of the labor market are essential to ensure that em-
ployees are assigned efficiently in the economy. Furthermore, firms need to draw on
their employees’ skills and training, and to incentivise performance, taking into
35 account compensation equality between men and women. Examining a sample of
companies in Mexico, Blomstro¨m (1985) showed that foreign firms were 79% more
efficient in their use of labor than their local peers due to factors such as training and
the level of business concentration. Haltiwanger et al. (2007), Iranzo et al. (2006),
and Newell and Relly (1996) all found that the personal characteristics of employees
40 contributed significantly to explaining differences in productivity between firms.
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Meanwhile, Dome´nech (2008) revealed that firms whose employees were better
trained were more productive. Guisa´n and Aguayo (2008) observed that productivity
per employee was very low in Spain compared with other developed economies. Fan
and Lui (2003) showed that the gender pay gap narrowed when the productivity of
5female employees in Hong Kong rose compared with their productivity as perceived
by their male peers. Likewise, Monk and Turner (2004) found that male–female
compensation differences decreased as employee productivity increased in South
Korea.
This variable is expected to be positive, as we understand that employee prod-
10uctivity gains will raise directors’ pay, given their responsibility for management.
However, the gender pay gap will also widen, as the positions of greatest responsi-
bility on company boards are usually occupied by men, who are therefore likely to be
credited with successfully raising productivity.
Return on assets
15Return on assets is another of the control variables considered, reflecting the firm’s
profitability in terms of income generated for every euro invested in assets. This
variable is denoted by “ROA” and is calculated as the ratio of ordinary income to
average total assets, although some authors, such as Manzaque et al. (2008), calculate
it as the ratio of the operating margin to total assets. We expect this variable to be
20positive, because an increase in a firm’s profitability will result in higher compensa-
tion for directors and a proportional widening of the gender pay gap. Arrondo et al.
(2008) and Ferna´ndez Me´ndez et al. (2011) show that the return on assets has a
positive and significant effect on directors’ pay.
Board size
25The last of the control variables considered is the size of the board, as the number of
directors may affect control and management of the firm. The board is the body
responsible for safeguarding the interests of the shareholders and controlling the
management team (Salas, 2002). The Spanish Code of Good Governance (CUBG,
2006) recommended that boards should have not less than five members and not
30more than fifteen. However, Burke et al. (2001) and Al-Mudhaki and Joshi (2004)
argue that boards should have between three and six members, and Merino et al.
(2009) found evidence to support a size of between three and twenty-two directors.
Some studies (e.g. Eisenberg et al., 1998) have shown that the number of board
members can affect supervisory and control functions, and the presence of too
35many directors may therefore hinder coordination and decision making. However,
other authors (e.g. Sa´nchez et al., 2008) have claimed that a larger number of dir-
ectors may permit more efficient control of the board’s functions. Sa´nchez et al.
(2008) also showed that the size of the board was positively related with executive
pay, while Guest (2010) found a positive association between board size and dir-
40ectors’ pay in the United Kingdom. Board size is denoted by “BDSIZE.” This variable
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is calculated as the total number of board members. It is expected to be positive, as a
larger board is likely to have more male members and, therefore, women will be in a
minority and will be less well able to ensure compensation equality between male and
female directors.
5 Firm Fixed Effect
The firm fixed effect control variable, denoted by “FIRM,” is intended to capture
unobservable and fixed characteristics of firms that may potentially be correlated
with the dependent variable. Specifically, we include year indicator variables to con-
trol for yearly differences.
10 5.3 Sample
The initial sample comprised 1392 firms/year listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange
between 2004 and 2011, inclusive. The information was obtained from the public
registries kept by the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV),
from the SABI data base and from corporate Web sites. Table 4 contains a descrip-
15 tion of the sample.
As may be observed in Table 4, the initial sample of 1392 firms/year did not
include financial institutions because they are under special scrutiny by financial
authorities that constrain the role of their board of directors and because of their
special accounting practices. A further 749 industrial firms were excluded because
20 not all the data necessary to test the model could be obtained, and the final sample
thus comprised 515 observations. Most of the industrial firms were discarded
because their Corporate Governance or Annual Reports did not contain details of
directors’ pay.
6. Analysis of results
25 6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous and continuous variables.
Panel A of Table 5 shows that 11%, on average, of the Nomination and
Compensation Committees have a female presence. In terms of educational level,
an average 86% of female independent directors did not disclose their qualifications
30 in the Corporate Governance Report, 8% were graduates and 6% held doctoral
degrees. Meanwhile, 10% of the firms in the sample belonged to FSEC (1) (Oil
and energy), 30% each to FSEC (2) (Commodities, industry, and construction)
and FSEC (3) (Consumer goods), 9% to FSEC (4) (Consumer services), 16% to
FSEC (5) (Financial and property services), and 5% to FSEC (6) (Technology and
35 telecommunications). Fifty-two percent of the firms are located in the Madrid region
(GREG (3)), 17% in the East of Spain (GREG (5)), 16% in the Northeast (GREG
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(2)), 8% in the South and Canary Islands (GREG (6)), 5% in the Northwest (GREG
(1)), and 3% in the Center (GREG (4)).
Ten percent of female directors had 1 year of seniority, 17% had between 2 and 4
years and 7% between 5 and 8 years of seniority, while 66% had no previous ex-
5perience as a board member.
As may be observed in Panel B of Table 5, the mean logarithm of compensation
differences between male and female directors is 6.914, which is to say that the pay
received by men is on average 6.914 times higher than the women’s pay. Also, the
average percentage of women by board is 3%, and the average company size is 13,130
10(Natural logarithm of total assets), the productivity per employee is 5730, the return
on assets is 6% and boards have 10.38 members on average.
6.2 Univariate analysis
Table 6 shows the mean values of the independent and control variables for the firms
in the sample, as well as the results of the parametric t test for the continuous
15variables, and Pearson’s Chi-squared for the dichotomous variables to test for the
presence of differences in means. The median (7.01) of the difference in the loga-
rithm of male and female directors’ pay was used to create the two groups.
As shown in Table 6, the difference in the means of the variable denoting the
percentage of women on the board is positive, but not statistically significant, and the
20first hypothesis tested cannot therefore be accepted, as the gender pay gap between
male and female directors is not affected by the percentage of women on the board.
Thus, we cannot conclude that a greater percentage of female directors on the board
will be more likely to result in a smaller gender pay gap among directors. Along the
same lines, the variable denoting the presence of women on the Nomination and
25Compensation Committee reflects a positive difference in the means as predicted.
However, this difference is not statistically significant, and the second hypothesis
therefore cannot be accepted. The two variables ELIWBD (1) and ELIWBD (2),
representing the educational level gained by female independent directors, displays
Table 4 Sample description
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Initial sample of companies 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 1392
Companies excluded (109) (106) (115) (105) (104) (111) (110) (117) (877)
Industrial companies 93 90 99 89 88 95 94 101 749
Financial companies 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 128
Final sample of companies 65 68 59 69 70 63 64 57 515
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Percentile 25 Percentile 50 Percentile 75
Panel A: Dummy variables
PWNCC 0.107 0.309
ELIWBD (0) 0.860 0.307
ELIWBD (1) 0.082 0.274
ELIWBD (2) 0.058 0.234
FSEC (1) 0.097 0.296
FSEC (2) 0.301 0.459
FSEC (3) 0.295 0.457
FSEC (4) 0.091 0.288
FSEC (5) 0.155 0.363
FSEC (6) 0.060 0.238
GREG (1) 0.047 0.211
GREG (2) 0.157 0.364
GREG (3) 0.520 0.500
GREG (4) 0.025 0.157
GREG (5) 0.175 0.380
GREG (6) 0.076 0.265
SEN (0) 0.660 0.448
SEN (1) 0.097 0.296
SEN (2) 0.169 0.375
SEN (3) 0.074 0.262
Panel B: Continuous variables
REMU 6.914 1.281 6.270 7.009 7.723
PERCWBD 0.030 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000
FIRMSIZE 13.132 1.851 11.718 12.851 14.416
PROD 5.727 1.690 4.951 5.672 6.714
ROA 0.060 0.448 0.006 0.021 0.071
BDSIZE 10.383 3.506 8.000 10.000 12.000
PWNCC: variable presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee,
which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if there is presence of women on
the Nomination and Compensation Committee and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD (0): variable edu-
cational level of independent women on the board of directors, which is calculated as a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if independent female directors do not provide infor-
mation about their educational level in the Corporate Governance Report and 0, otherwise;
ELIWBD (1): variable educational level of independent women on the board of directors,
which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if independent female directors
(continued)
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have a degree and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD (2): variable educational level of independent women
on the board of directors, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
independent female directors have a doctorate and 0, otherwise; FSEC(1): variable firm sector,
which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the oil and energy
sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(2): variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the company operates in the basic materials, industry and construction sector
and 0, otherwise; FSEC(3): variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value
1 if the company operates in the consumer goods sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(4): variable
firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the
consumer service sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(5): variable firm sector, which is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the finance and real estate sector and
0, otherwise; FSEC(6): variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the company operates in the technology and telecommunication sector and 0, otherwise;
GREG (1): variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the company is located in the North-Western region and 0, otherwise; GREG (2): variable
geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located
in the North-Eastern region and 0, otherwise; GREG (3): variable geographical region, which is
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the Madrid region and 0,
otherwise; GREG (4): variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the company is located in the Center region and 0, otherwise; GREG (5): variable
geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located
in the East region and 0, otherwise; GREG (6): variable geographical region, which is a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the South and the Canary Islands
region and 0, otherwise; SEN (0): variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if women directors on the board of directors do not have seniority and 0, otherwise;
SEN (1): variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women
directors on the board of directors have one year of seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN (2):
variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on
the board of directors have from 2 to 4 years of seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN (3): variable
seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the board of
directors have from 5 to 8 years of seniority and 0, otherwise; REMU: variable gap in pay
between male and female directors on the board of directors and is calculated as the log of the
difference between male and female director’s compensation in the board of directors;
PERCWBD: variable percentage of women directors on the board of directors and is calculated
as the ratio between the total number of female directors on the board of directors and the
total number of directors on the board of directors; FIRMSIZE: variable firm size and is
calculated as the log of total assets (in thousands of Euros); PROD: variable employee prod-
uctivity and is calculated as the log of (turnover/number of employees); ROA: variable return
on assets and is calculated as the ratio between ordinary result and average of total assets;
BDSIZE: variable size of the board and it is calculated as the total number of directors on the
board of directors.
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Table 6 Mean difference for independent and control variables
Variable Median of the gender gap
in pay in the board of
directors7.01
(N¼ 259)
Median of the gender
gap in pay in the
board of directors57.01
(N¼256)
Mean
difference
Univariate
test (Sig.)
PERCWBD 0.032 0.028 0.004 0.819 (0.413)
PWNCC 0.127 0.086 0.041 1.524 (0.128)
ELIWBD (1) 0.093 0.070 0.023 0.926 (0.355)
ELIWBD (2) 0.097 0.020 0.077 3.774*** (0.000)
FSEC (1) 0.178 0.016 0.162 6.441*** (0.000)
FSEC (2) 0.301 0.301 0.000 0.009 (0.993)
FSEC (3) 0.208 0.383 0.175 4.409*** (0.000)
FSEC (4) 0.120 0.063 0.057 2.260** (0.024)
FSEC (5) 0.127 0.184 0.057 1.762* (0.079)
GREG (1) 0.046 0.047 0.001 0.029 (0.977)
GREG (2) 0.127 0.188 0.061 1.875* (0.061)
GREG (3) 0.672 0.367 0.305 7.250*** (0.000)
GREG (4) 0.004 0.047 0.043 3.135*** (0.002)
GREG (5) 0.116 0.234 0.118 3.579*** (0.000)
SEN (1) 0.104 0.090 0.014 0.551 (0.582)
SEN (2) 0.178 0.160 0.018 0.528 (0.598)
SEN (3) 0.097 0.051 0.046 1.989** (0.047)
FIRMSIZE 14.131 12.122 2.009 14.661*** (0.000)
PROD 6.003 5.448 0.555 3.776*** (0.000)
ROA 0.100 0.021 0.079 2.015** (0.044)
BDSIZE 12.008 8.738 3.270 11.950*** (0.000)
PERCWBD: variable percentage of women directors on the board of directors and is calculated
as the ratio between the total number of female directors on the board of directors and the
total number of directors on the board of directors; PWNCC: variable presence of women on
the Nomination and Compensation Committee, which is calculated as a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if there is presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation
Committee and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD (1): variable educational level of independent
women on the board of directors, which is calculated as a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if independent female directors have a degree and 0, otherwise; ELIWBD (2): variable
educational level of independent women on the board of directors, which is calculated as a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if independent female directors have a doctorate and 0,
otherwise; FSEC(1): variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
the company operates in the oil and energy sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(2): variable firm
sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the basic
materials, industry, and construction sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(3): variable firm sector,
which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company operates in the consumer
(continued)
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a positive difference in the means, although this is only statistically significant at the
1% level in the case of ELIWBD (2). Consequently, it is likely that at least one woman
will hold a doctoral degree in those firms where the gender pay gap between male and
female directors is widest. This finding is in line with the evidence reported by
5Palacio and Simo´n (2002) and Simo´n (2006). Meanwhile, it may be observed that
the sector variables FSEC (1), FSEC (2), and FSEC (4) display a positive difference in
the mean, although it is only statistically significant at the level of 1% in the case of
FSEC (1) and 5% in FSEC (4). Thus, the male–female compensation difference
between directors is greater on the boards of firms belonging to the oil and energy
10sector and the consumer services sector. The difference in means is negative in FSEC
(3) and FSEC (5) and is statistically significant at the level of 1% and 10%, respect-
ively. Therefore, we may conclude that the gender pay gap is smaller in the consumer
goods sector and in financial services and property. Finally, we may observe that the
geographical region variable GREG (3) presents a positive and statistically significant
15difference at 1%. Consequently, the gap between the pay of male and female directors
is greater in firms located in Madrid. Meanwhile, GREG (1), GREG (2), GREG (4)
and GREG (5) show negative differences, which are statistically significant at 1% and
10% in all cases, except GREG (1). Hence, the gender pay gap among directors is
lowest in firms located in the North-East, Center, and East of Spain.
goods sector and 0, otherwise; FSEC(4): variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the company operates in the consumer service sector and 0, otherwise;
FSEC(5): variable firm sector, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company
operates in the finance and real estate sector and 0, otherwise; GREG (1): variable geographical
region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the
North-Western region and 0, otherwise; GREG (2): variable geographical region, which is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the North-Eastern region
and 0, otherwise; GREG (3): variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 if the company is located in the Madrid region and 0, otherwise; GREG (4):
variable geographical region, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company
is located in the Center region and 0, otherwise; GREG (5): variable geographical region, which
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company is located in the East region and 0,
otherwise; SEN (1): variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if
women directors on the board of directors have 1 year of seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN (2):
variable seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the
board of directors have from 2 to 4 years of seniority and 0, otherwise; SEN (3): variable
seniority, which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if women directors on the board of
directors have from 5 to 8 years of seniority and 0, otherwise; FIRMSIZE: variable firm size
and is calculated as the log of total assets (in thousands of Euros); PROD: variable employee
productivity and is calculated as the log of (turnover/number of employees); ROA: variable
return on assets and is calculated as the ratio between ordinary result and average of total
assets; BDSIZE: variable size of the board and it is calculated as the total number of directors
on the board of directors.
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We may also observe that the difference in means of all of the control variables is
positive and statistically significant, except in the case of SEN (1) and SEN (2). We
may therefore conclude that the compensation difference between male and female
directors will be greater in those firms larger where the board has more members and
5 includes women with between 5 and 8 years of seniority, and in firms displaying the
highest return on assets and with the highest employee productivity.
6.3 Multivariate analysis
The multivariate analysis looks at the results of the linear regression and the multi-
collinearity test.
10 Table 7 presents the results of the linear regression for the model proposed and for
the six variants, where the dependent variable represents the logarithm of the gender
pay gap among BD.
Model 1 includes all the independent variables included in the study, comprising
the characteristics of the board (PERCWBD, PWNCC, ELIWBD (1) and ELIWBD
15 (2)), the sector (FSEC (i)) and the region (GREG (i)), while Models 2, 3, and 4
examine the impact of each of the independent variables in isolation. Specifically,
Model 2 analyses board characteristics, Model 3 the sector and Model 4 the geo-
graphical region. Model 5 includes both the sector and the geographical region where
the firm is located, excluding the variables referring to the characteristics of the
20 board. Meanwhile, Model 6 analyses the variables referring to the board’s character-
istics and the sector, excluding the geographical region, and Model 7 includes the
board’s characteristics and the geographical region, excluding the sector variable.
The results for Model 1 show goodness of fit of 50–70%, and the model is stat-
istically significant at the 1% level. The variable denoting the percentage of female
25 board members (PERCWBD) is negative, contrary to our expectations, but it is not
statistically significant, and the hypothesis tested therefore cannot be accepted.
Consequently, an increase in the percentage of women on the board has no effect
on the gender pay gap between directors. According to this result, it cannot be
confirmed that a higher percentage of women directors on the board will be more
30 likely to result in a smaller gender wage gap among directors. Meanwhile, the variable
denoting the presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee
(PWNCC) displays the expected sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level of
significance. Hence, we can accept the second hypothesis proposed, concluding that
the presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee will in-
35 crease the gender pay gap among board members. According to this result, we can
confirm that the presence of female directors in the Nomination and Compensation
Committee influences the gender wage gap, widening it. Both of the qualifications
variables are negative, as expected, but only ELIWBD (1) is statistically significant at
the 1% level. Thus, the third hypothesis can be accepted and we can conclude that
40 the presence of well-qualified female independent directors on company boards will
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reduce the gender gap in pay among directors. In this light, we concur with Gardı´n
and del Rı´o (2009) and with Mukhopadhayay (2001) in confirming that the presence
of female independent directors holding degree level qualifications reduces the
gender pay gap between the men and women serving on a firm’s board.
5 The sector variable is negative for all sectors, except consumer services SEC (4),
which is positive. However, only financial services and property (FSEC 5) is statistically
significant at 1%. Hence, the fourth hypothesis is partially accepted, as only one of the
five sectors analyzed has an effect on gender wage pay, reducing it, and therefore, we
may conclude that in financial services and the property sector the gender gap is lower
10 than in the others. None of the variables denoting geographical region is statistically
significant, and the fifth hypothesis therefore cannot be accepted. Thus, it cannot be
confirmed that geographical region affects the gender gap in pay, as none of the regions
studied increased or narrowed the gender wage gap.
All the control variables offer the expected signs, but only the variables denoting
15 the presence of female directors with between 2 and 4 years of seniority (SEN(2)),
company size (FIRMSIZE), return on assets (ROA) and board size (BDSIZE) are
statistically significant. We therefore concur with Ala´ez and Ullibarri (1999) and
Lago (2002) that the presence of more experienced women (in terms of years of se-
niority) on company boards reduces male–female compensation difference between
20 directors, and that the gender pay gap widens with company size, return on assets,
and board size.
The results for Models 2, 3, and 4 are statistically significant at the 1% level and
present goodness of fit of 44.50%, 49.30%, and 44.30%, respectively. Model 2 ana-
lyses the individual influence of board characteristics (proportion of female board
25 members, qualifications of independent female directors, and the presence of women
on the Nomination and Compensation Committee) on the gender pay gap between
directors. Model 2 confirms the results obtained from the analysis of all of the
independent variables together, allowing the conclusion that the presence of
women on the Nomination and Compensation Committee increases the gender
30 pay gap between directors, while the presence of women graduates on company
boards reduces male–female compensation differences. The control variables for
Model 2 take the same signs at the same significance levels as in Model 1, except
for the productivity variable, which is negative in this model, but it is once again not
statistically significant, and SEN (3), which was not statistically significant in Model 1
35 but is so at the 10% level in Model 2.
The results obtained from Models 3 and 4, which respectively analyze the influ-
ence of the sector and geographical region of the firm, are very similar to those of
Model 1. Specifically, the only independent sector variable to change in Model 3 is
FSEC (1), which is positive where it was negative in Model 1. Once again, only FSEC
40 (5) is statistically significant. The results for the control variables are also the same,
except for employee productivity, which is statistically significant at the 10% level in
Model 3, although it was not so in Model 1. Thus, an increase in employee
The gender gap in pay in company boards 29 of 44
productivity entails a widening of the gender pay gap between directors. In this light,
we may again conclude that compensation differences between male and female
directors are reduced only in the financial services and property sector. The results
of Model 4 are the same as in Model 1, except in the case of employee productivity,
5which was positive in the latter, but is negative in Model 4. However, this variable is
not statistically significant in either model. In light of the results obtained in Model 4,
we may conclude that the region where a firm is located has no effect on the gender
pay gap between board directors.
Model 5 analyses the independent variables denoting the sector and geographical
10region together, while excluding board characteristics. The results obtained are the
same as for Model 1. Only FSEC (5) is negative, and it is statistically significant at the
1% level. Hence, the gender pay gap between directors is smallest in the financial
services and property sector. As in Model 1, the geographical region is not statistically
significant. Meanwhile, there is practically no change in the control variables with the
15exception of SEN (3), which is statistically significant at the level of 10% in Model 5.
Model 6 presents a goodness of fit of 50.20% and is statistically significant at the
level of 1%. The independent variables included in this model are the board char-
acteristics (PERCWBD PWNCC, ELIWBD (1) and ELIWBD (2)) and the sector to
which the firm belongs. As shown in Table 7, the results obtained from the inde-
20pendent and control variables included in Model 6 are the same as in Model 1, when
all of the independent variables are examined together.
Finally, Model 7 analyses the independent variables consisting of board character-
istics and the geographical region. It confirms the results revealed by Model 1, both for
the independent and for the control variables. The only exception is the sign of GREG
25(2) and employee productivity, as the first of these variables is positive and the second
is negative, contrary to the results found in Model 1. Neither is statistically significant,
however. In Model 7 the control variable SEN (3) is also statistically significant.
To test for multicollinearity, we calculated the Spearman correlation coefficients
for all of the variables included in the model. Table 8 shows the correlation matrix.
30Analysis of this table reports that the correlation between certain pairs of variables is
statistically significant at the level of 5% or 10%. These results are consistent with
earlier studies of gender gap in pay (Gardı´n and Del Rı´o, 2009; Ortega 2007).
However, none of the correlation coefficients is sufficiently high (4.80) to cause
any major multicollinearity problems (see Archambeault and De Zoort, 2001). We
35have also calculated the vector inflation factor (VIF) to corroborate that our results
are not biased because of the multicollinearity.
7. Conclusions
Cultural, political, and social changes in recent decades have seen women enter many
jobs that were once reserved for men. However, the limited participation of women
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in the labor market has resulted in a gender pay gap. Numerous studies in Spain and
internationally have investigated why such male–female compensation differences
should exist (Campos et al., 2010; Mateos et al. 2010; Simo´n, 2009). To solve this
problem, numerous regulations have been enacted to ensure that women are em-
5 ployed under equal conditions to men and to prevent male–female compensation
discrimination.
The aim of this study was to determine whether there is a gender gap in pay
among board directors of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange, in the period
2004–2011, inclusive, and to throw light on the reason for any gender pay gap found.
10 To achieve this aim, we examined the effect of the percentage of female directors
on the board, the presence of women on the Nomination and Compensation
Committee, the educational level of female independent directors, the sector in
which the firm operates and its geographical region, on the gender wage gap. The
results obtained show that the percentage of female board members does not influ-
15 ence the gender pay gap among directors, while the presence of women on the
Nomination and Compensation Committee actually widens the gap, as we predicted.
The explanation for this may be that the opinion of women members on both the
board and the Nomination and Compensation Committee is mitigated by their male
colleagues. In particular, the few female members on Nomination and Compensation
20 Committees are likely to come under considerable pressure in this regard, as these
committees are small and are clearly dominated by men. Our results also report that
the qualifications held by female independent directors influence board members’
pay, as the presence of women graduates narrows the gender pay gap, but not for
women who hold a PhD. It may be that better corporate governance implies full
25 disclosure of the director’s background and reduced gender gap, rather than a rela-
tionship between the latter and the educational level. The results also suggest that the
male–female compensation difference between directors is smaller in the boards of
financial services and property sector firms (FSEC (5)). The geographical region in
which the firm is located is not a relevant factor, as it does not affect the gender pay
30 gap among board members. We believe that the explanation for these findings may
be that the organizational culture of the firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange is
influenced by the values of their directors rather than by the culture of a specific
geographical region. This result may also be explained by the fact that the cost of
living is similar in all the regions considered. With regard to the control variables
35 used, we find that the presence of women with between 2 and 4 years of seniority on
company boards reduces the gender pay gap between directors, but the gap increases
in very large firms, where the return on assets is higher and where the board is larger.
We have constructed different variations to validate and confirm the model origin-
ally proposed. The results obtained from these models basically confirm the findings
40 from the original model, with some exceptions regarding the control variables.
The findings from this study reveal the existence of a gender gap in pay in the
boards of firms listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange. Specifically, the study shows
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that female directors suffer pay discrimination when the Nomination and
Compensation Committee has women members, in larger firms, in the most prof-
itable firms (i.e. those with the highest return on assets), and in the firms with the
largest boards. In contrast, the gender pay gap narrows when female independent
5directors are graduates, when the female board members have between 2 and 4 years
of seniority and in firms operating in the financial services and property sector.
Finally, we may observe that neither an increase in the proportion of female board
members nor the geographical region of the firm have any particular influence on the
gender pay gap. These findings, therefore, report that equality is still a long way off,
10and they should provide an incentive for regulators and politicians to press for
changes to prevailing legislation to improve the situation and progress toward the
elimination of male–female compensation discrimination at all levels. More effective
laws are clearly needed to reduce the gender pay gap found and to oblige firms to
comply on pain of sanctions.
15The gender quota on boards, in our sample, rises from 1.04% in 2004 to 6.62% in
2011. These data suggests that the Spanish quota is growing but not as much as is
expected, considering that in 2015 the quota in listed firms should legally be 40% (a
more in-depth discussion about this issue can be found in Terjesen et al., 2014).
Thus, even though the regulations have been introduced, the time permitted for
20reaching gender equality is long (8 years) and for this reason, it may be possible
that companies are not in a hurry to reach the gender quota of 40%. In any case,
we agree with Grosvold et al. (2007), who argue that a compulsory gender quota
(affirmative action programs) may have the potential to generate growth in female
representation in the boardroom and report that no negative effects of this initia-
25tive are likely to arise in the shape of the appointment of inexperienced female
directors.
This study is subject to certain limitations. In the first place, the study was carried
out in Spain for the period from 2004 to 2011, and the results obtained should
therefore not be extrapolated to other countries or periods. Secondly, the literature
30refers to the analysis of individual attributes (gender, educational level, seniority, and
experience), job attributes (type of contract, working hours, and occupation) and
attributes of the workplace (sector, collective bargaining agreements, region, firm
size, and compensation). Not all of this data (e.g. job attributes) could be obtained in
this study; however, the database used contains information drawn from Corporate
35Governance Reports and Annual Reports, and from corporate websites. Thirdly, in
this study we show association, not causation, between the presence of women on the
Nomination and Compensation Committee, the educational level of independent
women in the Board and the sector of the firm, and the difference between the
compensation of male and female directors. Finally, it is likely that gender quotas
40law for Spanish boards has little effect because sanctions are weak in comparison to
case from Norway, where the sanction if the company does not comply with the
gender quota is extremely serve: the dissolution of the company. The only gender
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quota law similar to the Norwegian one in terms of effectiveness is the Italian one,
introduced only in 2011.
This study may give rise to future lines of research. In the first place, an analysis of
directors’ pay, distinguishing between fixed and variable compensation, would be
5 valuable in throwing light on the potential of incentives to narrow the gender pay
gap. Second, it would be interesting to establish whether male–female compensation
differences exist at all levels of an organization or merely on the board, assessing the
equality plans applied by firms in their recruitment and selection processes. Third, it
would be relevant to examine employee pay taking into account the wages of im-
10 migrant workers to establish whether firms discriminate in this area. Finally, it would
also be interesting to study the pay earned by both male and female directors in
international firms and to establish whether any gender-based compensation differ-
ences that may come to light are due to political, cultural, or social factors.
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